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EXPLORING THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF TEENS
IN RELATIONSHIP TO SEXTING AND CENSORSHIP
Julia Halloran McLaughlin*
This Article explores child pornography law in relation to teen sexting conduct.
Recently, some teens who engaged in teen sexting have been convicted under
child pornography laws and have been required to register as sexual predators.
The criminalization of teens for developmentally typical behavior, mimicking the
conduct of adults, can result in grave harm to most teens. Furthermore, the ap-
plication of child pornography laws to teen sexting conduct demonstrates the
constitutional overbreadth of the current definition of child pornography. Photo-
graphs have an emblematic role in society-capturing and celebrating youth.
Moreover, the creation of teen sexting images accompanies a teen's developmen-
tal quest for a sexual identity and individuation. Thus, teen sexting images
constitute teen sexual speech and are entitled to some degree of constitutional
protection, so long as the images are not obscene. The variable obscenity stand-
ard of Ginsberg v. New York has since been modified by the Bellotti v. Baird
strict scrutiny standard. Thus, any legislation related to teen sexual speech must
be narrowly tailored to protect the minor from harm, or further another compel-
ling state interest. This Article tests the author's proposed teen sexting legislation
under the Bellotti test.
INTRODUCTION
As teens mature sexually, emotionally, and cognitively, they
should enjoy expanded First Amendment rights and responsibili-
ties commensurate with their age and experience. The prevalence
of teen sexting' demonstrates the budding sexuality of teens as
they explore ways to communicate and express their sexuality. In
exploring the thorny issues raised by Teen Sexting Images (TSIs),'
* I would like to extend my thanks to my colleagues at Florida Coastal School of Law
who provided guidance and encouragement to me as I worked on this Article. I would par-
ticularly like to thank Rebekah Gleason, Brian Foley, and Lynn McDowell for their time and
thoughtful comments on working drafts of this Article. Additionally, I want to thank Jessica
Hansen, FCSL Class of 2012, and Thomas Mangan, FCSL Class of 2013, for their dedicated
research assistance.
1. For the purposes of this Article, teen sexting is defined as the practice among
teens of taking nude or partially nude digital images of themselves or others and texting
them to other teens, emailing them to other teens, or posting them on web sites such as
Myspace.com or Facebook.com.
2. In this Article, teen sexting images (TSIs) are defined as images that are of one
or more individuals between the ages of thirteen and eighteen, including self-images
(depicted person or persons); that are captured in a traditional or digital photographic
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the First Amendment defines the zone of free speech. For the rea-
sons explored in this Article, it is arguable that pornography law, as
applied to TSIs, must comply, at a minimum, with modified First
Amendment freedom of speech protections for minors.
Under current law, the Supreme Court's decision to afford First
Amendment protection to pornography, but not to obscenity or to
child pornography, creates the initial controlling legal framework
applicable to TSIs. Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized
legislative authority to further restrict a minor's access to pornog-
raphy, complicating the constitutional status of TSIs. Assuming
that TSIs fall outside the definition of child pornography and ob-
scenity, tension arises between the legislative authority to regulate a
minor's right to engage in sexual speech and attempts to criminal-
ize teen sexting. Given the absence of empirical evidence of harm
and the developmental justification for recognizing a zone of con-
stitutionally protected teen sexual speech, prosecution of teens
engaged in teen sexting as pedophiles should cease. Instead, states
should draft legislation permitting teens to create and possess TSIs
under limited circumstances and treating willful violations as a ba-
sis to adjudicate a minor delinquent. Any such statute must satisfy
the modified strict scrutiny standard articulated in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti II).6 The legislation must be narrowly tailored to achieve
the state's compelling interest in protecting minors from harm.
Part I of this Article is divided into two sections. The first section
frames the issues by examining existing federal and state child
or video format; that, if shared, are shared among teens between the ages of thirteen and
eighteen; and that are not obscene as defined under applicable state and federal law.
3. See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
4. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37, 643 (1968).
5. In an earlier article, Julia McLaughlin, Cime and Punishment: Teen Sexting in Context,
115 PENN ST. L. REv. 135 (2010), I reviewed state and federal law on the issue of teen sex-
ting and proposed a model statute that recognized the right of minors to create and possess
self-created TSIs. This earlier article identified a zone of teen privacy, but did not fully de-
velop the First Amendment justifications for the creation, possession, and limited
distribution of TSIs. Id. at 173-75. In my first article, I examined the current case law, legis-
lation, and pending legislation dealing with TSIs, id. at 150-68, and proposed model
legislation based upon my research. Id. at 175-79. In this Article, I delve into the First
Amendment constitutional justifications for the private creation, possession, and limited
distribution of TSIs. It furthers teen sexting scholarship by reasoning that teen sexting
should typically be deemed a status offense, handled through juvenile justice diversion pro-
grams, without detention or sex offender registration. This is in stark contrast to the
application of mandatory minimum terms of incarceration and sexual predator registration
requirements applicable to minor teens charged with child pornography crimes when they
are tried as adults under applicable waiver rules.
6. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellottill), 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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pornography statutes and federal case law.7 The second section
provides a brief summary of the state response to teen sexting.
After providing this context, Part II focuses on the element of
harm associated with child pornography and demonstrates that the
definition of child pornography now requires evidence of harm or
potential harm to the child pictured. Part III justifies the inclusion
of TSIs as speech and explores the developmental justification for
creating a zone of protected teen sexual speech. Part IV identifies
the appropriate constitutional standard of review to protect this
zone. Finally, Part V illustrates the need for a separate teen sexting
statute, sets forth a formerly proposed teen sexting model statute,
and applies the Bellotti II test to determine its constitutionality in
relationship to a teen's First Amendment rights.
I. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW AND TEEN SEXTING
A. Summary ofFederal Law
While the First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, not
all speech is of equal societal value. In Roth v. United States, the Su-
preme Court recognized an adult's right to possess pornography so
long as it was not obscene." In Miller v. California,9 the Supreme
Court identified the controlling definition of obscenity, recogniz-
ing that not all pornography constitutes obscenity.' Nine years
later, in New York v. Ferber," the Court recognized the ability of the
states to enact legislation that protects the welfare of minors and,
in furtherance of this interest, to outlaw depictions of minors that
portray sexual acts, even if the images did not satisfy the definition
7. Those familiar with the federal law relating to child pornography and the state
precedent of prosecuting teens who engaged in teen sexting conduct may wish to proceed
directly to Section II of this Article.
8. See 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
9. See 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In Miller, the Supreme Court introduced the following
definition of obscenity:
(a) [W]hether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
10. See id. at 26.
11. See 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982).
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of obscenity.2 In reaching its decision, the Ferber Court relied heavily
upon the legislative judgment that using children in pornography
harms them in a number of ways: it interferes with a child's ability
to form healthy attachments later in life," it is an intrinsic form of
child abuse, it creates a permanent record of the abuse, and it
continues the harm to the child through distribution. 5 Given this
evidence of immediate and ongoing harm to children, the Ferber
Court recopized a state's right to reject the Miller obscenity test as
too narrow6 and craft a state-specific standard under which to ana-
lyze the constitutionality of state child pornography laws. The Ferber
Court noted, "[a]s with all legislation in this sensitive area, the
conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the appli-
cable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.""
Thus, the Ferber Court created the child pornography excep-
tion, another category of speech falling outside of the protections
afforded by the First Amendment.'8 Nevertheless, legislation pro-
hibiting child pornography must satisfy some constitutional
standards: "[h]ere the nature of the harm to be combated re-
quires that the state offense be limited to works that visually
depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age. The cat-
egory of 'sexual conduct' proscribed must also be suitably limited
and described." 9
The Ferber Court continued to clarify its holding in relationship
to the Miller obscenity standard:
The Miller formulation is adjusted in the following respects:
A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the
prurient interest of the average person; it is not required
that the sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently
offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be con-
sidered as a whole . . . . As with obscenity laws, criminal
responsibility may not be imposed without some element of
scienter 20 on the part of the defendant.2 1
12. See id. at 764.
13. See id. at 758 & n.9.
14. See id. at 759.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 761.
17. Id. at 764.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. The element of mens rea in child pornography cases requires intentional conduct
with respect to each element of the crime. See Note, Child Pornography, the Internet, and the Chal-
lenge of Updating Statutory Terms, 122 HARv. L. REv. 2206, 2209-10 (2009). It seems far from
clear that teens engaging in sexting satisfy the requisite mens rea element to qualify as child
pornographers.
21. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
318 [VOL. 45:2
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The Ferber Court noted that "the distribution of descriptions or
other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which
do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual
reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment
protection." Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted that
obscenity must do more than inspire mere lust, defined as a
"healthy, wholesome, human reaction common to millions of well-
adjusted persons in our society, rather than to any shameful or
morbid desire."2 3
Following Ferber, state and federal lawmakers passed legislation
prohibiting the creation, possession, and distribution of child
pornography. In 1996, Congress passed The Child Pornography
Protection Act.24 This statute banned not only the use of live chil-
dren in pornography, but also computer-generated images. In
2002, the Supreme Court struck down the computer-generated
images portion of the law in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, which
linked child pornography convictions to the harm to the child or
children used to create the images. Absent the use of and harm to
a real child or children, virtual child pornography with digitized
pixel images does not fall within the definition of child pornog-
raphy. Thus, the Court ruled unconstitutional the portion of the
statute encompassing virtual, digitized child pornography. In
support of its decision, the Court reasoned:
The argument that virtual child pornography whets pedo-
philes' appetites and encourages them to engage in illegal
conduct is unavailing because the mere tendency of speech
22. Id.
23. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 499 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
24. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
26 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006)), invalidated in part by Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
25. See id. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2006) defines "child pornography" as "any visual depic-
tion, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated
image or picture," that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct," and any sexually explicit image that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression" it depicts "a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct ..... Id.
26. 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). The Free Speech Coalition Court held:
Thus, the CPPA does more than prohibit pandering. It bans possession of material
pandered as child pornography by someone earlier in the distribution chain, as well
as a sexually explicit film that contains no youthful actors but has been packaged to
suggest a prohibited movie. Possession is a crime even when the possessor knows the
movie was mislabeled. The First Amendment requires a more precise restriction.
Id. at 238.
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to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for ban-
ning it, absent some showing of a direct connection between
the speech and imminent illegal conduct. The argument
that eliminating the market for pornography produced us-
ing real children necessitates a prohibition on virtual images
as well is somewhat implausible because few pornographers
would risk prosecution for abusing real children if fictional,
computerized images would suffice. Moreover even if the mar-
ket deterrence theory were persuasive, the argument cannot justify the
CPPA because, here, there is no underlying crime at all.,
The criminal prohibition against producing virtual images is
therefore unconstitutional, because no child is actually harmed.
In addition to the federal statutes described above, Congress
also passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (the
Adam Walsh Act or AWA) in 2009.2" The first title of this Act, the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)," creates
a national sex offender registry and seeks to eliminate differences
in state sexual offender registration laws in order to implement a
uniform national standard.0 The statute requires mandatory sex
offender registration if the convicted defendant is over the age of
fourteen." Today, every state has a statute criminalizing the crea-
tion, possession, and distribution of child pornography"-and
federal law mandates state-enforced sexual offender registration.
Thus, teens engaged in sexting may be charged under child por-
nography laws and become subject to federally-mandated sex
offender registration rules.
27. Id. at 236-37 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006).
29. The first subchapter of the AWA is entitled the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA). Id. § 16913. Some commentators have questioned the constitu-
tionality and wisdom of the AWA. See, e.g., Anne Marie Atkinson, The Sex Offender Registration
Act (SORNA): An Unconstitutional Infringement of States' Rights Under the Commerce Clause, 3
CHARLESTON L. REV. 573 (2009); Steven J. Costigliacci, Protecting our Children From Sex Offend-
ers: Have We Gone Too Far?, 46 FAM. CT. REv. 180 (2008).
30. See, e.g., Jacob Frumkin, Perennial Punishment? Why the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act Needs Reconsideration, 17 J. L. & POL'Y 313 (2008). Frumkin states: "AWA sets
forth harsh penalties for a sex offender who simply fails to register as required by SORNA."
Id. at 318-20 (footnotes omitted).
31. Id. at 344-45.
32. See 50 State Statutory Surveys: Criminal Laws: Crimes: Child Pornography, 0030
SURVEYS 5 (West 2010).
33. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071-14072 (2006). States must adopt minimum sex offender
registry standards or else face a reduction in federal law enforcement funding. See id.
§ 14071(g) (2).
[VOL. 45:2320
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B. Overview of State Responses to Teen Sexting.
Given the broad directive of Ferber requiring that the prohibit-
ed conduct be adequately defined, specific definitions of child
pornography differ from state to state. Many state statutes require
nudity or partial nudity as an element of the crime . Some states
prohibit the creation, possession, and distribution of sexually
suggestive images of minors, thus eliminating the nude or partial-
ly nude requirement. 5 Clearly, images depicting sexual conduct
by a child may fall far short of the local definition of obscenity.
State courts across the country have faced the dilemma of
whether the broad language of child pornography laws encom-
passes teen sexting. Teens and their parents have been shocked to
discover that the child pornography laws are broad enough to en-
compass this conduct.36 For example, in 2006, an Iowa jury
convicted an eighteen-year-old high school senior under the state
child pornography statute prohibiting knowingly disseminating
37obscene material to a minor, sentenced the teen to one-year pro-
bation, a $250 fine, and required him to register as a sex offender.
34. For example, many states have adopted a legal standard that gives courts and pros-
ecutors broad discretion in categorizing an image of a minor as pornographic. See, e.g., 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11- 20.1(a)(1)(vii) (Supp. 2009) ("A person commits the offense of
child pornography who ... [depicts or portrays a child] in any pose, posture or setting in-
volving a lewd exhibition of the unclothed or transparently clothed genitals, pubic area,
buttocks, or, if such person is female, a fully or partially developed breast of the child or
other person[.]"); OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 21, § 1024.1 (West 2002) (including within the "child
pornography" definition visual depictions where the "lewd exhibition of the uncovered
genitals ... has the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer," and defining sexual con-
duct to include "acts of exhibiting human genitals or pubic areas").
35. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.01( 7 )(e) (West 2008) (defining "sexually explicit
conduct" to include the "lewd exhibition of intimate parts").
36. See, e.g., Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing a District
Attorney's threat to prosecute a teen despite a lack of evidence that she either possessed or
distributed the nude photo); A.H. v. Florida, 949 So.2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(upholding the adjudication of a teen-age woman as delinquent for "producing, directing or
promoting a photograph or representation that she knew included sexual conduct of a
child"); Iowa v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 529-30 (Iowa 2009); Washington v. Vezzoni, No.
22361-2-III, 2005 WL 980588, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2005).
37. Under Iowa law:
[a]ny person, other than the parent or guardian of the minor, who knowingly dissem-
inates or exhibits obscene material to a minor, including the exhibition of obscene
material so that it can be observed by a minor on or off the premises where it is dis-
played, is guilty of a public offense and shall upon conviction be guilty of a serious
misdemeanor.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 728.2 (West 2006).
38. Canal 773 N.W.2d at 529-30.
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In that case, State v. Canal, senior Jorje Canal, upon the request
of his fourteen-year-old high school friend, sent an electronic pho-
to of his nude erect penis to her, along with a picture of his face
and the words "I love you."3" The jury conviction was recently af-
firmed on appeal.4 0 The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the jury's
determination that the photo of Canal's nude penis was obscene.
The jury instructions adopted the Miller contemporary community
standard language modified to reflect the community's view as to
"what is suitable material for minors."4 2 The jury instructions de-
fined obscene material as:
[A] ny material depicting or describing the genitals, sex acts,
masturbation, excretory functions or sadomasochistic abuse
which the average person, taking the material as a whole and
applying contemporary community standards with respect to what is
suitable material for minors,4 3 would find appeals to the pruri-
ent interest and is patently offensive; and the material, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, scientific, political, or artis-
*44tic value.
Thus, while perhaps constituting "mere nudity"*4 under the adult
standard, given the "suitable material for minors"4 6 standard, the
e-mailed photograph was deemed obscene. By adhering to the
statute designed to encompass and punish adult pedophilia, the
court ignored many important issues. The image was self-created
by a male who was a senior in high school and recently a minor, it
was sent at the request of a female minor three years his junior, it
was not further published, and it was not sent with any desire to
harm or embarrass the recipient. Thus, tried as an adult, Jorge
Canal paid a heavy price for what some might describe as a youth-
ful indiscretion.
39. Id. at 529.
40. See id. at 532.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 530-32.
43. See infra notes 145-151 and accompanying text. The use of an obscenity standard
geared for minors in accordance with the Ginsberg standard further complicates the constitu-
tional questions associated with teen sexting laws.
44. Canal, 773 N.W.2d at 530-31 (emphasis added) (noting that the definition in the
jury instructions matched IOWA CODE ANN. § 728.1(5) (West 2006)).
45. Id. at 533.
46. Id. See infra notes 146-148 discussing the creation and implementation of the vari-
able obscenity standard under Ginsberg.
47. A similar price was paid by Phillip Alpert. See Elizabeth M. Ryan, Sexting: How the
State Can Prevent a Moment of Indiscretionfrom Leading to a Lifetime of Unintended Consequences for
Minors and Young Adults, 96 IowA I. REv. 357, 359-60 (2010).
322 [VOL. 45:2
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Perhaps Canal might have succeeded in reversing his conviction
had counsel challenged the constitutionality of the variable ob-
scenity standard. Although the Canal court relied upon this
standard as introduced by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg," the Io-
wa court did not confront the question of whether the state
variable obscenity standard unduly interfered with the minor's
right to possess such photos according to the Bellotti Il9 approach.50
Additionally, in Canal, there was no allegation of harm to the recip-
ient; therefore, the Ashcroft"' element of harm was also absent.
Washington courts also faced the issue of teen sexting. In 2005,
the Washington Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's convic-
tion of Anthony Vezzoni. In September 2002, Vezzoni's girlfriend
allowed him to take photos of her, including shots of her un-
clothed breasts and genitals."5 Anthony took the pictures to school
and showed them to his classmates. Even though Vezzoni was six-
teen-years-old, the state charged Vezzoni with "one count of
sexual exploitation of a minor, one count of dealing in depictions
of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and one count of
possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit
conduct" and prosecuted him as an adult." Following a bench
trial, Vezzoni was found not guilty of sexual exploitation of a mi-
nor.5 6 However, he was convicted of possession of and dealing in
the depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.57
On appeal, Vezzoni argued that the category of banned speech in
the statute was unconstitutionally broad because it lacked the word
"lewd" and, further it lacked a scienter element."5 The court rejected
both of the defendant's arguments and affirmed the conviction.5
The court summarily rejected the defendant's scienter arguments.0
Likewise, in finding the images merely sexually stimulating, rather
48. See Canal, 773 N.W.2d at 531.
49. See infra notes 157-172 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.






57. Prior to amendment, the Washington statute provided: "A person who knowingly
possesses visual or printed matter depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct is
guilty of a class B felony." WASH REV. CODE § 9.68A.070 (1990), amended by WASH REV. CODE
§ 9.68A.070 (2010).
58. See Vezzoni, 2005 WL 980588, at *3-4.
59. Id. at *3.
60. Id. at *4.
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than obscene, the court raised, but did not address, the question of
whether teens have a First Amendment right to create and possess
indecent images."
II. TEEN SEXTING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
A. No Empiri cal Evidence of Harm
In each of the above cases, the prosecutors and the courts
failed to consider whether the policy underlying the child pornog-
raphy law would be furthered by prosecuting the teens. The Ferber
Court, as previously noted, identified the following three public
policy interests in support of modifying the Miller formula to in-
clude child pornography: (1) it interferes with a child's ability to
form healthy attachments later in life, (2) it is an intrinsic form of
child abuse," and (3) it is a permanent record of the abuse and
continues the harm to the child through distribution.
A review of Iowa and Washington cases demonstrates that the pol-
icy goals underlying the child pornography laws are not implicated,
much less advanced, by charging teens as child pornographers. With
respect to the first element, absent evidence of psychological trau-
ma associated with the depictions or publications at issue, there is
no reason to conclude that sexting interferes with a teen's ability to
form healthy attachments later in life.
Similarly, absent evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or duress
in cases where the image was self-taken or voluntarily and consen-
sually created, there is no evidence that creating the image is an
66
intrinsic form of child abuse. Additionally, absent nonconsensu-
al publication, there is no evidence that the permanent record
continues the harm to the child through distribution. Finally,
the significant age differential between the individual capturing
the image and the minor pictured in most child pornography cases
is missing in teen sexting cases; thus, the element of sexual preda-
tion is also missing. Given these distinctions, it seems highly
unlikely that legislators intended to place TSIs within the reach of
child pornography statutes.
61. See id. at *3.
62. See supra notes 36-59 and accompanying text.
63. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 & n.9 (1982).
64. See id. at 759.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 759.
67. See id.
[VOL. 45:2324
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The poor fit between the legislative intent underlying child
pornography law and teen sexting conduct is starkly illustrated by
the recent Iowa Supreme Court decision in State v. Canal.6 The
sentence imposed by the Canal Court included imprisonment,
fines, and mandatory sexual offender registration."o The harsh and
unanticipated results of prosecuting teens for sexting conduct
under child pornography laws is currently prompting legislatures
to enact teen sexting legislation that embodies an appropriate and
measured legal response.' Any such response should recognize a
zone of First Amendment protection for teen sexual speech,
including TSIs.
Construing TSIs as child pornography does not achieve the stat-
utory intent of the laws designed to protect minors from adult
sexual predation. While the Supreme Court has yet to address the
issue, as previously noted, several state courts have interpreted the
definition of child pornography to include TSIs.7 ' Awaiting guid-
ance from the Supreme Court, a number of scholars have directly
and indirectly addressed the issue of whether TSIs constitute child
pornography or whether TSIs fall within a zone of protected teen
speech.
B. Scholars Agree
John A. Humbach suggests four possible outcomes to the ques-
tion of whether teens have a "constitutional right to record and
document their own legal activities, in particular, sexual conduct
and nudity."7  Humbach acknowledges that while obscene teen
sexting pictures garner no constitutional protection, "even pictures
and videos that are not obscene may still be illegal if they fall into
68. Cf State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 528 (Iowa 2009).
69. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
70. Canal 773 N.W.2d at 529.
71. McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 159-68.
72. See supra notes 36-59 and accompanying texts.
73. John A. Humbach, Sexting and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433,
438 (2010). See also Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: Whzen Chil-
dren Become Child Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18 CommLAw
CONSPECTUS 1 (2009); Lawrence G. Walters, How to Fix the Sexting Problem: An Analysis of the
Legal and Policy Considerations for Sexting Legislation, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 98 (2010);
Sarah Wastler, The Harm in "Sexting"?: Analyzing the Constitutionality of Child Pornography
Statutes that Prohibit the Voluntary Production, Possession and Dissemination of Sexually Explicit
Images by Teenagers, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 687, 701 (2010) ("Any attempt to restrict the
rights of minors to produce and distribute sexually explicit photographs of themselves must
be weighted against the constitutional rights of minors to engage in such sexually expressive
speech.").
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the broad constitutional category of 'child pornography.' "7
Humbach also states that a fair reading of Ashcroft5 results in a
more limited definition of child pornography that requires exploi-
tation" of a child made to engage in sexual conduct," by an adult,"
who profits commercially79 from the images captured in photo-
graphs or videos. The resulting harm is not only immediate,
because of the assault to the child's dignity, autonomy, and body,80
but also encompasses a continuing harm as recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Osborne v. Ohio.81 Thus, absent evidence of
exploitation, immediate harm, continuing future harm, and com-
mercial gain, Humbach posits, "Both Ferber and Osborne are ...
distinguishable from cases of teen sexting and autopornography,
and their reasons do not justify the suppression of materials made
by teens acting on their own." 2
Humbach predicts that the law requiring categorical exclusion
of child pornography from First Amendment protection will evolve
in one of four ways: (1) the Ferber categorical exclusion will be in-
terpreted to include teen sexting, (2) the categorical exclusion
under Ferber will be applied if new research and studies demon-
strate that teens involved in sexting suffer serious harm, (3) the
categorical exclusion under Ferber will continue subject to a case-by-
case "as applied" constitutional challenge, or (4) "[t]he scope of
the categorical exclusion established in Ferber will be clarified and
adjusted so that it does not impinge on teenagers' interests in free
self-expression [.]1
Humbach's concern with criminalizing conduct engaged in by a
majority of the teens in the United States is shared by the lawyers
associated with the Juvenile Justice Center (JJC)." The JJC filed an
74. Humbach, supra note 73, at 438.
75. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 251-53 (2002).
76. Humbach, supra note 73, at 464. See also Elizabeth C. Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sen-
sible Legal Approaches to Teenagers'Exchange of Self-Produced Pornography, 25 BERKLEY TECH. L. J.
555, 585 (2010) ("Meanwhile, it is important to note that the child protection objective
underlying the criminalization of child pornography may not justify the regulation of sex-
ting.").
77. Humbach, supra note 73, at 465.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 466.
81. Id. (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990)).
82. Id. at 467.
83. Id. at 483.
84. Id. at 438. The JJC provides care, treatment, and rehabilitation to juveniles involved
in the juvenile justice system. Brief of Juvenile Law Center as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellees at 6, Miller v. Skumanick, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-2144) [hereinafter
JJC Brief].
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amicus brief in the Miller case 5 that promoted two central argu-
ments: (1) not all unwise juvenile behavior should be criminalized
and (2) prosecuting sexting cases will involve juveniles needlessly
in the criminal justice system."
First, the JJC argued that "sexting represents the convergence of
technology with adolescents' developmental need to experiment
with their sexual identity and explore their sexual relationships."8 '
Characterizing sexting as the most recent example of a teen trend
reflecting "normal adolescent behavior, the prosecution of it is
contrary to the purpose of the juvenile justice system."8 The JJC
argued that the statute criminalizing child pornography, when ap-
plied to minors, should be construed to further the twin goals of
the juvenile justice system: sheltering minors from the criminal jus-
tice system and "intervening in the lives of child offenders" by
"providing them 'with room to reform.'"" Thus, by threatening to
prosecute the teens under the applicable child pornography stat-
utes, the state uses the juvenile justice system "not as a shield but a
sword.",0
The JJC next argued that sexting does not implicate the "com-
pelling child protection justification",' undergirding child
pornography law. In its brief, the JCC cited Ashcrof9 for the propo-
sition that child pornography law is "anchored. . . in the concern
for the participants [in the production], . . . the 'victims of child
pornography.' "3 The JCC reasoned that most teen sexting conduct
is voluntary and entirely unrelated to pedophilia.
Amy Kimpel argues that the threat of child pornography
prosecution chills teens' rights to sexual self-expression and
application of child pornography law to TSIs constitutes "content-
based censorship." The threat of such prosecution chills the
internet speech of teens' online communities formed to explore
sexual identity in the comparative safety of cyber chat rooms,
rather than the heat of the moment in Chevy flatbeds."
85. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (2010).
86. JJC Brief, supra note 84, at 1.
87. Id. at 5-9 (use of capitalization in original omitted).
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 13.
91. Id. at 14-16 (use of capitalization in original omitted).
92. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2002).
93. JJC Brief, supra note 84, at 16.
94. Amy F. Kimpel, Using Laws Designed to Protect as a Weapon: Prosecuting Minors Under
Child Pornography Laws, 34 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 299, 327 (2010).
95. Id. at 330.
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Before TSIs dominated the headlines, Professor Alan Garfield
noted in 2005 that "the constitutionality of child-protection
censorship remains largely a muddle."6 Garfield identifies a series of
relevant considerations to guide policy makers in drafting and
enacting constitutional rules, while providing guidance to the
judiciary in navigating the extremes between affording greatjudicial
deference to child censorship laws and invalidating such legislation
as prohibited in all cases. Garfield notes that the application of
strict scrutiny to child censorship laws would not always result in
invalidity, because the Court has recognized that the state has a
compelling interest in protecting minors from "patently offensive
sex-related material."" Garfield observes that the Court's decision
to forgo evidence that the material under scrutiny is, in fact,
harmful to minors under a variable obscenity standard resulted in
a deferential approach to such legislation that scholars have since
derided:99
Just as the Court in Roth did not demand proof that obscene
speech was harmful to adults, so the Court has not demanded
evidence that this "variable obscenity" is harmful to minors.
The Court's willingness to forgo any assessment of the impact
of sexual speech is misplaced. While it may be true that the
Court did not demand such evidence in its landmark obsceni-
ty case, it is also true that many scholars have been harshly
critical of the Court's obscenityjurisprudence.'00
Thus, courts risk similar criticism by failing to require evidence of
the harm that is the basis of the prohibition.
Accordingly, Garfield encourages the judiciary to demand "em-
pirical evidence of harm from sexual speech"10 ' in the context of
shielding minors from sexually explicit speech. The evidence of
harm presents difficult questions in relation to sexual speech that
does not meet the definition of obscenity. Garfield poses a series of
questions: "Is it harmful if it leads to minors engaging in protected
96. Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 570 (2005).
97. Id. at 575-76.
98. Id. at 582 & n.69 (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.,
518 U.S. 727, 743 (1996)).
99. Id. at 612.
100. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM.
L. REv. 931, 940 (1980) (describing the Court's "inaccurate factfinding" in the Paris Theatre
Saloon Iobscenity case as "obviously deplorable")).
101. Id. at 612-13. Garfield notes that the Ginsberg Court did not demand empirical evi-
dence of harm, rather deeming it a matter of "common sense." Id. at 613.
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sex? Is it harmful if children become aware of their sexuality at an
earlier age? Is it harmful if children believe it appropriate to have
multiple sex partners or for married individuals to have affairs?"'02
In addition to evidence of harm, Garfield suggests that there must
also be evidence that most parents would support the suppressive
legislation, presenting yet another hurdle given the absence of
consensus regarding a minor's access to sexually explicit speech.03
Finally, according to Garfield, the court must demand some evi-
dence of the nexus between the suppressed speech and the
resulting harm.' 4 Garfield concludes that any such legislation must
satisfy narrow tailoring requirements and vagueness and over-
breadth standards.0o
In contrast, other scholars continue to advance the state's parens
patriae interest in protecting minors from the harm associated with
child pornography to justify statutes that prohibit a teen's right to
create, possess, and distribute consensual TSIs.'06 These scholars
focus on the presumed harmior to minors engaged in this conduct
and limiting the flow of child pornography in the commercial
market.o These valid concerns must be balanced against the con-
stitutional free speech rights of maturing minors.
III. THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES TO TEENS A MODIFIED ZONE
OF PROTECTED SEXUAL SPEECH THAT INCLUDES TSIs
Historically, children were considered chattel and the property
of their father.'0o As the law evolved, so did its vision of the rights of
children and the role of the state in securing these rights. As a nat-
ural outgrowth of the state's parens patriae role to protect the rights
of those lacking power and wealth, the state began to recognize the
102. Id. at 626.
103. Id. at 622.
104. Id. at 627.
105. Id. at 629.
106. See, e.gJordan J. Szymialis, Sexting: A Response to Prosecuting Those Growing Up with a
Growing Trend, 44 IND. L. REv. 301, 331-32 (2010) ("[L]ocated in a digital form, the [TSI]
image has access to the Internet, which 'allows for unprecedented voyeurism, exhibitionism
and inadvertent indiscretion."'); see also Walters, supra note 73; W. Jesse Weins & Todd C.
Hiestand, Sexting, Statutes and Saved by the Bell: Introducing a Lesser juvenile Charge With an
"Aggravating Factors"Framework, 77 TENN. L. REv. 1, 50 (2009).
107. Mary Graw Leary, Sexting or Self-Produced Child Pornography? The Dialogue Continues-
Structured Prosecutorial Discretion Within a Multi-Disciplinary Response, 17 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
486, 521-22 (2010) (relying upon contemporary case law and practical observation to estab-
lish harm to teens engaged in teen sexting).
108. Szymialis, supra note 106, at 331.
109. Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 113, 121 (2009).
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rights of minors."o The Supreme Court has rejected the fiction that
constitutional rights arise at the age of majority."' In fact, minors
enjoy a wide variety of constitutional rights enjoyed by adults,
including: the right to equal protection from racial discrimina-
tion;1 1 2 the right to due process, including most of the rights
afforded to adults accused of a crime such as the rights to coun-
sel, notice, confrontation, cross-examination, and the privilege
against self-incrimination;" and rights requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt if accused of a serious crime"'4 and protection
against double jeopardy. "5
Specifically with respect to First Amendment rights, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that minors enjoy the right to access
non-obscene information and enjoy the freedoms of speech, ex-
pression, and religion."6 Thus, the question arises whether TSIs
fall within the definition of teen speech protected by the First
Amendment.
A. TSIs Constitute Teen Sexual Speech
In Kaplan v. California, the Supreme Court broadly defined
speech to include "pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engrav-
ings, both oral utterance and the printed word have First
Amendment protection.""' This protection ends when speech col-
lides "with the long-settled position of this Court that obscenity is
not protected by the Constitution."" While some have criticized
110. See Patricia M. Wald, Making Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 13, 15
(1974) ("The child's subjugated status was rooted in the same benevolent despotism that
kings, husbands, and slave masters claimed as their moral right.") See also LEGAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN 116 (Robert M. Horowitz & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1984) (describing the state
of childhood as "continuing from the age of birth to the age of majority, at which time the
young person is presumed to be capable of responsible adult decision making").
111. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
112. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
113. In m Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-57 (1967).
114. In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
115. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) ("We hold that the prosecution of re-
spondent in Superior Court, after an adjudicatory proceeding in Juvenile Court, violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
116. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); In re Appeal In Maricopa
Cnty., Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 887 P.2d 599, 604-05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (citing
Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975)).
117. 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973).
118. Id.
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this broad definition of speech,"9 TSIs constitute pure speech. This
assertion is supported by the recent Supreme Court decision in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, which yet again emphasized
the broad protections afforded to freedom of speech under the
Constitution, including the speech rights of minors.20 The Brown
Court broadly defined the scope of protected speech to include
video games, without regard to content:
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded
them, video games communicate ideas-and even social
messages-through many familiar literary devices (such as
characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features
distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction
with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amend-
ment protection. Under our Constitution, "esthetic and moral
judgments about art and literature ... are for the individual
to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the
mandate or approval of a majority., 21
In her essay In Plato's Cave, Susan Sontag explores the communi-
cative power of photography.'22 She describes photographs as
"miniatures of the world that anyone can make or acquire."2 Fam-
ilies use photography to "portrait-chronicle" the connectedness of
family.124 Sontag observes that photographs allow individuals to
"take possession of space in which they are insecure." '2 5 Moreover,
the picture will survive long after the event it records. Thus, the
picture immortalizes the event'26 and invites the viewer to reverie:27
119. See Daniel Mark Cohen, Unhappy Anniversary: 7hirty Years Since Miller v. California:
The Legacy of the Supreme Court's Misjudgment on Obscenity, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 545, 632
(2003) (criticizing the Court's definition of the scope of protected speech, saying, "[tihe
Court's erroneous and imprudent choice of the superfluously broad term, 'works,' requires
the complex, qualifying predicate of the statement. Only one letter need be changed to
render a more concise, accurate, and meaningful statement of fact: the First Amendment
protects, not works, but words."). But see Ryan, supra note 47, at 366 ("A sexting image is not
speech per se. However, a sexting image may qualify as protected expressive conduct.").
120. Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
121. Id. (citing United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)).
122. SUSAN SONTAG, In Plato's Cave, in ON PHOTOGRAPHY (1977); see also Kimpel, supra
note 94, at 313 & nn.76-78 & 80.
123. SONTAG, supra note 122, at 5, 16, 24.
124. Id. at 8. See also Kimpel, supra note 94, at 328. Kimpel compares the American ma-
laise with gay sexuality in the 1980s to its current discomfort with teen sexuality: "The
experiences of a gay man during the AIDS epidemic and that of a child in the current era
are markedly different, but they share the experience of having society try to eradicate any
evidence of their entire demographic's sexuality." Id.
125. SONTAG, supra note 122, at 9.
126. Id.at11.
127. Id. at 16.
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A photograph is both a pseudo-presence and a token of ab-
sence. Like a wood fire in a room, photographs-especially
those of people .. . are incitements to reverie. The sense of
the unattainable that can be evoked by photographs feeds di-
rectly into the erotic feelings of those for whom desirability is
enhanced by distance.1
Photos communicate. Whether the photographer and the viewer
receive the same message is not a required element to establish
non-verbal speech,'"9 because a dialogue is occurring, and only by
permitting and fostering the dialogue can communication and
understanding arise.
The attraction of sexting to teens should come as no surprise
given the communicative power of the photograph. Developmen-
tally, teens seek to separate themselves from their parents and
claim expanding autonomy, including sexual autonomy.'30 The
typical absence of dialogue between parents and their children
regarding natural sexual maturation creates uncertainty and
angst, a sexual space that is unfamiliar and threatening. Through
self-created erotic images, teens as the photographers of them-
selves take possession of their own bodies and sexuality, thus
affording the teen a sense of power and control.
Additionally, the photo captures "a neat slice of time,"'3 ' immor-
talizing the teen's body in its youth, providing a token reminder to
the viewer of potential sexual pleasure. Arguably, sexting empow-
ers the teen who creates the image, facilitates individuation and a
healthy development of teen sexuality, and gives to teens a sense of
mastery over their own sexuality. It is difficult to envision a form of
speech more elemental, even primordial, than the communication
embodied in TSIs.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Nonverbal conduct
constitutes speech if it is intended to convey a particularized message and the likelihood is
great that the message will be understood by those who view it, regardless of whether it is
actually understood in a particular instance in such a way.") (citing Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974)).
30. JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 97-122 (2006) (discuss-
ing how adult constitutional rights are based on two alternative and parallel theories of
moral and political philosophy: welfare and autonomy theories).
131. See SONTAG, supra note 122, at 17.
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B. A Developmental justification for Creating a Zone
of Protected Teen Sexual Speech
James Dwyer suggests that the legal theoretical framework sup-
porting adult constitutional rightsm1 2 also provides a basis for
extending similar, though not identical, rights to minors-
increasing the degree of liberty and autonomy afforded to minors
as they approach the age of majority. 33 Dwyer writes about the legal
difficulties created when the interests of the state, the parents, and
the child diverge.m He suggests that children appear to suffer be-
cause "the legal rules governing particular decisions about their
relational lives do not require state decision makers to act with a
single-minded focus on the welfare of the affected children."'3m
Although Dwyer focuses on the rights of children involved in
custody, abuse, and neglect proceedings, Dwyer's theory is applica-
ble in developing a legal and societal response to teen sexting.
Teens approaching the age of majority are individuating from their
parents, beginning to form emotional and intimate relationships
with peers, and are using technology as a method of flirting and
assessing whether further amorous advances might be welcomed.3
Thus, the decision whether and with whom to engage in teen sex-
ting is at its core a relationship right. Current laws that criminally
punish this behavior, therefore, ignore this right.
Teen sexting is one way a minor begins to form an interpersonal
relationship with an age-appropriate partner. It takes on added
developmental significance because the "sense of one's individuality
and importance that arises from positive interpersonal experiences
gives rise to the ... perception that it is worthwhile and morally
requisite to engage in self-authorship."m Thus, when teen sexting
is viewed as self-authorship, rather than autopornography, a series
of rights-based questions arise, rather than the series of retributive
questions raised by the prosecution of minors as sex offenders.
Dwyer notes, "[w]hen we account for the developing capacities of
132. DWYER, supra note 130, at 97-122 (discussing two alternative and parallel theories
of moral political philosophy upon which adult constitutional rights are based: welfare and
autonomy theories).
133. Id. at 163.
134. See id. at 2.
135. Id.
136. See THE NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, SEX AND
TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 2-4 (2008), available at http://
vw.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTechSummary.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2011) (reporting that "66% of teen girls and 60% of teen boys claimed that they sent sexual-
ly suggestive content to be 'fun and flirtatious"').
137. DWYER, supra note 130, at 117.
WINTER 2012]1
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
persons approaching the age of majority, we call them 'adoles-
cents' or 'mature minors' or something else to denote their
relatively advanced but still less-developed-relative-to-adults powers
of decision making."'"
IV. TSIs THAT FALL WITHIN A ZONE OF PROTECTED TEEN SEXUAL
SPEECH ARE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER A MODIFIED
STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD
The Supreme Court has recognized that teenagers may behave
irresponsibly; thus, when this conduct is developmentally appro-
priate, the Court has rendered teens less culpable for their
conduct than adults.'"9 For example, the Court invalidated both the
juvenile death penalty 40 and, most recently, the sentence of juve-
nile life without parole for non-homicide convictions 4' based in
part on this justification.
Research demonstrates that teens are less aware of risks because
they are less knowledgeable, they lack experience, and they dis-
count the long-term consequences of misconduct. This
discounting occurs because the brain has not fully matured until a
person reaches his or her early twenties .' Teen sexting is a logical
consequence of the intersection between the budding teen libido
and technology.'4 3 In fact, "a vital part of adolescence is thinking
and experimenting with areas of sexuality. It is through experi-
mentation and risk-taking that adolescents develop their identity
and discover who they will be."' Given these important develop-
mental differences, the Supreme Court has historically afforded
special protection to the constitutional rights of minors: " [thus,
minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because
the state has a greater range of interests that justify the infringe-
ment of minors' rights." 4 5
138. Id. at 125-26.
139. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,835 (1988) (plurality opinion).
140. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (citingJ. Arnett, Reckless Behavior in
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 339 (1992)).
141. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
142. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
143. JJC Brief, supra note 84, at 6. ("Technology allows teenagers to negotiate this im-
portant task of exploring their sexual identity while avoiding the embarrassment of doing so
face-to-face.").
144. Lynn E. Ponton & SamuelJudice, Typical Adolescent Sexual Development, 13 CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 497,508 (2004).
145. Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1997). See also
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37, 643 (1968) (upholding a statute prohibiting the
sale of pornography to minors while permitting such sale to adults); Prince v. Massachusetts,
334 [VOL. 45:2
Exploring the First Amendment Rights of Teens
A. Ginsberg v. New York
Approximately forty years ago, the Supreme Court in Ginsberg at-
tempted to provide some guidance to courts addressing the
constitutionality of statutes affording to minors sui generis constitu-
tional protections differing from those afforded to adults under
the same factual circumstances. Initially, the Supreme Court ap-
plied rational basis review to uphold a statute prohibiting the sale
of pornography to minors.'4 6 The Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statute because the state may rationally
conclude that exposure to the prohibited material is harmful to
young people. 14 Thus, the Court upheld the state statute creating a
juvenile obscenity standard based upon two state interests: a par-
ent's right to rear children free from material the parents deemed
harmful 4" and the state's interest in legislating to protect the wel-
fare of minors. '4 The Ginsberg Court relied upon New York state
law to support its decision:
While the supervision of children's reading may best be left to
their parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance
cannot always be provided and society's transcendent interest
in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regula-
tion of the sale of material to them. It is, therefore, altogether
fitting and proper for a state to include in a statute designed to
regulate the sale of pornography to children special standards,
broader than those embodied in legislation aimed at control-
ling dissemination of such material to adults.' 5
Thus, the Ginsberg Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute
prohibiting the sale of pornography to minors based upon what
scholars and jurists have called the variable obscenity standard.'5 ' It
321 U.S. 158, 167-68 (1944) (concluding the state's interest in protecting minors justified a
statute prohibiting minors from selling street literature even though such prohibition would
be unconstitutional if applied to adults).
146. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 643.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 639.
149. See id. at 640. The statute in question defined "harmful to minors" to include mate-
rial that "predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interests of minors
.... " Id. at 632-33. Curiously, Miller changes the obscenity standard of Roth, but remains
silent as to the juvenile obscenity standard established in Ginsberg. Cf Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975).
150. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y.
1965)).
151. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 767 (1978) ("Although the govern-
ment unquestionably has a special interest in the well-being of children and consequently
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is valuable to highlight the limited scope and application of the
statute upheld by Ginsberg the prohibition did not bar parents
from purchasing the magazine for a minor child, it only applied to
commercial transactions, and it only applied to material "utterly
without redeeming social importance for minors.",5 2 Thus, the
creation, possession, and non-commercial distribution of TSIs
raises a variety of factually distinct questions left unanswered by the
Ginsberg Court!
B. Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville
Subsequently, the Supreme Court invalidated a similar statute
applying the variable obscenity standard. In Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, the Court examined the constitutionality of a statute
prohibiting the exhibition of motion pictures containing nudity.
The statute provided:
It shall be unlawful .. . for any ticket seller, ticket taker, usher,
motion picture projection machine operator, . . . or any other
person connected with or employed by any drive-in theater in
the City to exhibit ... any motion picture, slide, or other exhib-
it in which the human male or female bare buttocks, human
female bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are shown, if
'can adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to youths than on
those available to adults,' the Court has accounted for this societal interest by adopting a
'variable obscenity' standard that permits the prurient appeal of material available to chil-
dren to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of minors.") (citations omitted);
Garfield, supra note 96, at 612.
152. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646.
153. Arguably, TSIs could be subject to a variable obscenity standard. The New York
statute modified the Roth standard and provided:
6. "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in
whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic
abuse, when it:
(a) Considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; and
(b) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole
with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(c) Considered as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value
for minors.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney 2011).
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such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit is visible from any
public street or public place.1 54
In examining the constitutionality of this statute, the Supreme
Court characterized the statute as content-based censorship."1 5
The state justified the statute based upon its broad police power
to protect the welfare of minors. In addressing this argument, the
Court commented, "[il t is well settled that a State or municipality
can adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials
available to youths than on those available to adults.""6 The Court
further commented, "[n]evertheless, minors are entitled to a sig-
nificant measure of First Amendment protection, and only in
relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government
bar public dissemination of protected materials to them.""7
The Court ultimately invalidated the statute as overly broad
because:
The ordinance is not directed against sexually explicit nudi-
ty, nor is it otherwise limited . . . . Speech that is neither
obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate
proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable
for them. In most circumstances, the values protected by the
First Amendment are no less applicable when government
seeks to control the flow of information to minors. 5
Thus, the Erznoznik Court recognized that state lawmakers must
comply with First Amendment protections when they seek to limit
the flow of information to minors. The state may not prohibit a
minor's right to speech based alone upon the belief that the con-
tent is unsuitable.
C. Bellotti v. Baird II
The constitutionality of legislation limiting the rights of minors
to seek abortions in the 1970s and 1980s refocused the Supreme
Court's attention on the degree to which the state may constrain
154. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 206-07.
155. Id. at 213.
156. Id. at 212.
157. Id. at 213-14 (citation omitted).
158. Id. The Court also noted "[w]e have not had occasion to decide what effect Miller
will have on the Ginsberg formulation. It is clear, however, that under any test of obscenity as
to minors not all nudity would be proscribed. Rather, to be obscene 'such expression must
be, in some significant way, erotic.'" Id. at 213 n.10.
WINTER 2012] 337
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
the constitutional rights of minors. The Supreme Court observed,
"[t] he question of the extent of state power to regulate conduct of
minors not constitutionally regulable when committed by adults is
a vexing one, perhaps not susceptible of precise answer."" In an
attempt to better articulate the difference, the Supreme Court in
Bellotti II identified three reasons justifying the adjustment in level
of scrutiny for statutes abridging the constitutional rights of mi-
nors: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the im-
portance of the parental role in child rearing."60
The Bellotti H test has since been applied by courts to analyze the
constitutionality of other statutes abridging the fundamental rights
of minors. For example, in Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, while
addressing the validity of a curfew statute under the First Amend-
ment, the court applied the Bellotti II modified strict scrutiny
approach, recognizing that:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of ma-
jority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court in-
deed, however, long has recognized that the state has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of chil-
dren than of adults. It remains, then, to examine whether
there is any significant state interest in [the effect of the stat-
ute] that is not present in the case of an adult. 16 1
The Nunez court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate the juvenile
curfew statute by recognizing that the state had a compelling in-
terest "in reducing juvenile crime and juvenile victimization,"" but
rejecting the statutory scheme as insufficiently narrowly tailored.'
It follows that even when the state establishes a compelling in-
terest to constrict the rights of a minor based upon the content of
TSIs, it must do so in a narrow or reasonable manner.164 This con-
159. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977).
160. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
161. Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976)).
162. Id. at 947.
163. Seeid.at951.
164. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 760 (1996)
("Consequently, we cannot find that the 'segregate and block' restrictions on speech are a
narrowly, or reasonably, tailored effort to protect children. Rather, they are overly restrictive,
sacrificing important First Amendment interests for too speculative a gain. For that reason
they are not consistent with the First Amendment.") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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clusion is reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association.'6 5 There the Court expressly
held, "whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-
advancing technology, the basic principles of freedom of speech
and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary
when a new and different medium for communication appears,"
so long as the speech does not fall within the traditional limited
areas such as obscenity, fighting words, or incitement." The Court
further opined that "new categories of unprotected speech may
not be added to the list by a legislature that concludes certain
speech is too harmful to be tolerated."'" Therefore, TSIs constitute
a new and different form of electronic communication. So long as
the images are not obscene under Miller or a variable obscenity
standard informed by Bellotti II, and they are created by and shared
among age-appropriate partners, such images fall within an area of
speech that enjoys constitutional protection.
Thus, a careful analysis of both the state's interest implicated in
legislating teen sexting conduct and the sufficiency of the legisla-
tive tailoring remains necessary. The state interest in the welfare of
minors should be analyzed in light of the overarching theoretical
framework surrounding the First Amendment rights of minors as
they approach adulthood, adolescent brain science, and the Dwyer
theory of increasing juvenile rights and responsibilities. Additional-
ly, the limitations placed on state intervention under Bellotti I1must
be recognized because the state enjoys only "somewhat broader
authority" to regulate the conduct of minors.69
V. TEEN SEXTING LEGISLATION MUST SATISFY THE MODIFIED
STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD
A. Model Teen Sexting Legislation
The theoretical framework above can best be understood when
applied to a teen sexting statute. While this author has previously
proposed the following model teen sexting legislation, 70 the
model legislation has not been scrutinized under the First
Amendment constitutional framework developed in this Article.
165. Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
166. Id. at 2733 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
167. See id.
168. Id. at 2734.
169. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
170. McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 175-79.
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A separate teen sexting statute is justified because of the legal dis-
tinction between child pornography, which is illegal, and legal
non-obscene pornography picturing adults. The distinction is
based entirely upon the age of those pictured, without regard to
the age of the individual creating, possessing, or distributing the
image. Adults aroused by child pornography are referred to as
pedophiles."' They are reviled by society.' 2 Even after serving
their sentences, they continue to be ostracized by society.' 3 Pedo-
philes suffer sentences that can be harsher than those for persons
who commit murder." 4 Thus, the law reflects a tremendous ani-
mus against pedophiles.
In contrast, TSIs represent a token of age appropriate sexual
expression between sexually mature teens. Other scholars have
characterized Supreme Court child pornography jurisprudence
as "[leaving] open issues regarding whether borderline materials
depicting children are protected by the First Amendment."'7 5 This
Article suggests that whether teen sexting images are entitled to
constitutional protection depends on content and intent.76 Ab-
sent the elements of predation and harm, TSIs should not fall
within the definition of child pornography.
The Supreme Court has held that "depictions of nudity, with-
out more, constitute protected expression."'" In relation to child
pornography, the distinction between "protected and unprotect-
ed speech . . . is twofold: (1) whether the child is engaged in
sexual conduct; or (2) whether the nudity depicted is lewd." 7 8
171. See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. Rjv. 921, 923 (2001)
("Pedophiles have emerged as the new communists in our popular imagination.").
172. See id. at 934.
173. See, e.g., Brett Jackson Coppage, Balancing Community Interests and Offender Rights:
The Validity of Covenants Restricting Sex Offenders from Residing in a Neighborhood, 38 URB. LAW.
309, 309-10 (2006) (describing the use of covenants to keep registered sex offenders out of
some communities).
174. See Adler, supra note 171, at 934 n.58 (noting that Arizona law mandates a mini-
mum prison sentence of twelve years for violating child pornography laws compared to a
ten-year minimum for second-degree murder).
175. Weins & Hiestand, supra note 106, at 8.
176. Id. at 16.
177. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990) (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 765 n.18 (1982)).
178. Weins & Heistand, supra note 106, at 17 (footnotes omitted). Many courts look
to the six-factor Dost test to decide whether an image is lewd. See United States v. Dost, 636
F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239
(9th Cir. 1987), and aff'd, 813 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1987) (factors include: "1) whether the
focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area; 2) whether the
setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally asso-
ciated with sexual activity; 3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in
inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 4) whether the child is fully or
partially clothed, or nude; 5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a
willingness to engage in sexual activity; 6) whether the visual depiction is intended or
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Thus, the image must reflect sexual conduct or include nudity
designed to arouse the viewer."'9 Child pornography law focuses
on content and the age of the minor depicted-rather than the
identity and age of the creator and the relationship between the
party creating the image, the minor depicted, and the viewer.
Therefore, existing child pornography law criminalizes TSIs cre-
ated by minors and shared with minors-who are engaged in
developmentally appropriate conduct. The Ferber definition of
child pornography sweeps too broadly and intrudes into the
realm of protected teen sexual speech.
Thus, a unique and distinct legal response to teen sexting is
required. It should be crafted to take into account the expanding
constitutional rights of minors after they reach puberty and as
they approach adulthood. Teen sexting legislation must satisfy the
First Amendment variable obscenity standard announced in Gins-
bergso as well as the modified strict scrutiny standard announced
by Bellotti I.jl' Affording modified strict scrutiny protection to
TSIs reflects an autonomy-based model that gives greater First
Amendment protection to a teen as the teen matures and ap-
proaches adulthood.13
designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer"). This issue has been further complicated
by the Third Circuit ruling in United States v. Knox, holding that the definition of lewd in
relationship to child pornography does not even require nudity. 32 E3d 733, 745-46 (3d Cir.
1994) ("Hence, as used in the child pornography statute, the ordinary meaning of the
phrase 'lascivious exhibition' means a depiction which displays or brings forth to view in
order to attract notice to the genitals or pubic area of children, in order to excite lustful-
ness or sexual stimulation in the viewer. Such a definition does not contain any
requirement of nudity, and accords with the multi-factor test announced in United States v.
Dost for determining whether certain material falls within the definition of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(2)(E).") (footnote omitted).
179. See generally Weins & Heistand, supra note 106, at 26-27 (discussing the meaning
of lewd).
180. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635-37 (1968).
181. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
182. Additionally, teen privacy rights are also implicated. See, for example, any law
review articles examining the right to sexual privacy of teens. Amanda M. Hiffa, "OMG
TXTPIXPLZ: The Phenomenon of Sexting and the Constitutional Battle of Protecting Minors from
their own Devices, 61 SYRACUSE L. REv. 499, 521 (2011) (arguing, "The Carey decision
stands not only for the right of minors to enjoy sexual privacy, but also recognizes the reality
that minors are sexually active."); Amy F. Kimpel, Using Laws Designed to Protect as a Weapon:
Prosecuting Minors Under Child Pornography Laws, 34 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 299, 332
(2010) ("Branding sexually active minors who seek to memorialize their private intimate
conduct as criminals delegitimizes the relationships and sexual autonomy of adolescents.");
Nicole Phillis, When Sixteen Ain't So Sweet Anymore: Rethinking the Regulation of Adolescent Sexual-
ity, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 271, 283 (2011) ("After highlighting the substantive due
process infringements and public policy concerns, this Article argues that states should con-
sciously reject the protectionism-versus-enablement paradigm in the regulation of
adolescent sexuality and adopt a more comprehensive and internally-consistent body of
law.").
183. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 634.
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When an adult creates a nude or partially nude digital image
and sends it to a desired sexual partner-so long as the image is
not obscene, the image is welcomed, and the desired partner is an
adult-the act is legally protected. 1 4 When a minor engages in the
same conduct, the minor is guilty of a crime under child pornog-
raphy law. As previously argued, the criminal statute is improperly
applied to teens given the absence of the defining characteristic:
immoral sexual attraction to a child that causes harm to that child.
In fact, the act of teen sexting properly falls within the definition
of a status offense. 1 5 The child pornography statute prohibits teens
from engaging in conduct that, like underage drinking, running
away, and violating curfew, would otherwise be legal for adults.
Thus, neither criminal prosecution nor delinquency adjudication
is the proper response to all teen sexting.1 6 Several scholars have
proposed model statutes," while others have outlined the content
and policy goals of ideal statutes.18 This Article follows in that tra-




A. The intent of this statute is:
184. Even if legal, however, sexting creates risks for indiscriminate adults. For a discus-
sion of the Anthony Weiner sexting scandal, which led to Congressman Weiner's ultimate
resignation despite the legal age of all parties involved, see generally Congressman Weiner
Resigns, MSNBC (June 17, 2011, 8:03 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43425251/ns/
politics-capitol-hill/.
185. One definition of status offense is "a nondelinquent/noncriminal offense; an of-
fense that is illegal for underage persons, but not for adults." U.S. Dep't. ofJustice, Statistical
BriefingBook, Glossary, OFFICE OFJUVENILEJUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, available
at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/glossary.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). Status offenses
are identified by state statute and typically include truancy, running away, and curfew viola-
tions. Id. The definition of a status offense is subject to the constitutional challenge of
vagueness and overbreadth when it includes a category that is subjective. See, e.g., Julie J.
Kim, Left Behind: The Paternalistic Treatment of Status Offenders Within the Juvenile justice System,
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 843, 864 (2010).
186. This Article reflects my additional thoughts with respect to teen sexting and rein-
forces and further justifies the proposed statute I advanced in my earlier article.
187. See, e.g., Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Crime and Punishment: Teen Sexting in Context,
115 PENN. ST. L. REv. 135, 175-79 (2010); Szymialis, supra note 106, at 335-38; Walters,
supra note 73, at 136-39; Weins & Hiestand, supra note 106, at 50-53.
188. See, e.g., Eraker, supra note 76, at 589-92; Leary, supra note 107, at 542-65; Ryan,
supra note 47, at 376-82.
189. McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 175.
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a) to exempt Teen Sexting Images from the state and
federal definition'9o of child pornography;
b) to create a consistent legal response;
c) to educate teens regarding the creation, possession,
and distribution of Teen Sexting Images;
d) to promote early intervention;
e) to create a diversionary program to educate teens
who create and share Teen Sexting Images without
the intent to harm those depicted;
f) to punish and deter teens who create, possess, or
distribute Teen Sexting Images with the intent to
cause emotional harm, to embarrass, or to stigma-
tize those depicted; and
g) to require that Teen Sexting is redressed within the
juvenile justice system.
1I. Definition of a Teen Sexting Image
A. A "Teen Sexting Image" is an image:
a) that is of one or more individuals between the ages
of 13 and 18, including self-images (depicted per-
son or persons);
b) that is captured in a traditional or digital photo-
graphic or video format;
c) that, if shared, is shared among teens between the
ages of 13 and 18; and
d) that is not obscene as defined under applicable
state and federal law.
III. Permitted Conduct.
A. Teens between the ages of 15 and 18 may voluntari-
ly create and privately possess Teen Sexting Images
so long as they do not violate Section IV of this
Statute.
B. Teens between the ages of 13 and 14 may voluntari-
ly create and privately possess Teen Sexting Images
so long as they do not violate Section IV of this
Statute. However, the court shall have the discretion
to direct the state agency designated to supervise
children in need of services or deemed dependent
190. This goal will require federal legislation recognizing this exception to the federal
sex offender registration rules.
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to initiate an investigation regarding the need for
supervision.91
IV. Violation.
A. A person who is between the ages of 13 and 18192
commits a delinquent act if, the teen without the
consent... of each depicted person:
a) Creates a Teen Sexting Image;
b) Possesses a Teen Sexting Image; or
c) Distributes a Teen Sexting Image:
1. to a person not depicted;
2. by posting it on a public web page;
3. by electronically sharing it with a person or persons
not depicted; or
4. by otherwise sharing it with a person or persons not
depicted.""
IV. The consequences of statutory violation shall be de-
termined based on the mens rea involved.
A. If the actor recklessly9 5 creates, possesses, or dis-
tributes a Teen Sexting Image without the consent
of the depicted person or persons, the actor:
191. The distinction between older teens and younger teens is designed to recognize
the increasing role of teen autonomy and creates a zone of absolute privacy for teens be-
tween the ages of fifteen and eighteen who have the ability to consent to sex in a majority of
the states within the United States. For younger teens, the legislation expressly recognizes
the court's discretion to order state oversight if there is a concern regarding knowing con-
sent, maturity, and the teen's ability to comprehend the long-term consequences of the
conduct.
192. Legislators must decide whether to exempt all minors from sex-offender prosecu-
tion or only those who possess images of minors deemed old enough to participate
voluntarily and knowingly in the conduct pictured. The model statute identifies the age of
thirteen, the age most minors enter seventh grade, and the average age minors reach sexual
maturity, as the appropriate age. Additionally, this statute extends juvenile court jurisdiction
to eighteen-year-old-teens who create, possess, or distribute teen sexting images because
many high school seniors do not graduate until after they reach age eighteen.
193. The term "consent" raises a host of definitional problems because verbal consent
may not be freely given. Thus, a teen that consents does so verbally and is supported by the
objective conduct of the minor. Cf Kelly C. Connerton, Comment, The Resurgence of the Mari-
tal Rape Exemption: The Victimization of Teens by Their Statutory Rapists, 61 ALB. L. REV. 237,
277-78 (1997).
194. This portion of the statute is designed to deter negligent publication of third-party
TSIs and to educate teens regarding the potential consequences of this conduct.
195. This standard assumes "that all tortious conduct can be placed on a scale of unrea-
sonableness, comprised of ordinary negligence, a middle tier of recklessness, and
intentional conduct." Edwin H. Byrd, III, Comment, Reflections on Willful, Wanton, Reckless,
and Gross Negligence, 48 LA. L. REv. 1383, 1400 (1988).
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a) Shall be enrolled in a mandatory diversion pro-
gram;
b) Shall not be adjudicated delinquent; and
c) Shall not be required to register as a sex offender.
B. If the actor intentionally creates, possesses, or dis-
tributes a third-party Teen Sexting Image with or
without the consent of the depicted person or per-
sons, and with the specific intent to cause emotional
harm, to embarrass, or to stigmatize any depicted
person or persons, the actor:
a) Shall be adjudicated delinquent;
b) Shall have phone and internet use monitored for a
reasonable period of time;
c) Shall undergo education regarding privacy rights,
the internet, and the legal meaning and importance
of consent in relationship to matters of sexual inti-
macy;
d) Shall not be tried as an adult; and
e) Shall not be required to register as a sex offender. 9 6
Subsequent violations of this Statute by the same teen shall be
handled by the judge in juvenile court under Section IV (B).
B. Bellotti II Applied to the Proposed Teen Sexting Legislation
Should such a statute be enacted, it must pass constitutional
muster. The first step of this analysis is "to determine whether the
state has a more compelling interest""' in protecting a minor from
the potential harms associated with sexting than it does in protect-
ing adults. Even where such an interest exists, under the Bellotti H
test, the teen rights involved remain fundamental and the statute
in question must be narrowly tailored.9 8
196. Legislators must decide whether to exempt all minors from sex-offender prosecu-
tion or only those who possess images of minors deemed old enough to participate
voluntarily and knowingly in the conduct pictured. The statute identifies the age of thirteen,
the age most minors enter seventh grade and the average age minors reach sexual maturity,
as the appropriate age.
197. Belloti l, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
198. See Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945-46 (9th Cir. 1997); see
also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (plurality opinion); Brenda
D. Hofman, The Squeal Rule: Statutory Resolution and Constitutional Implications-Burdening the
Minor's Right of Privacy, 1984 DUKE I.J. 1325, 1341 (1984) ("The state's interest in protecting
its young people from harm, however, does not affect the fundamental nature of the minor's
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The first criterion of the Bellotti II test permits state regulation
that might otherwise be unconstitutional as applied to adults to
protect the "peculiar vulnerability of children."'99 However, this
state interest wanes as the minor approaches adulthood. At least
one court has considered whether this factor refers to the physical
weakness of minors as compared to adults, describing minors as
"smaller, weaker, and less capable of taking care of themselves[.]' 2"0
This interpretation suffers because many adults may also fall into
this category if they are elderly, weak, or ill.20 ' Thus, this justifica-
tion alone is insufficient to explain the disparate treatment of
teens and adults.202
Under the second Bellotti II factor, a court must consider wheth-
er the "inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner" presents the court with a compelling state interest to re-
strict a minor's constitutional rights-in this instance the right to
create, possess, or distribute TSIs. 20' This Bellotti Hfactor is cited in
cases examining Miranda warnings given to minors204 and in cases
supporting the idea of invalidating a minor's confession on the ba-
right, but rather, is a separate factor to be weighed in order to evaluate whether the right is
burdened justifiably. In itself, the state interest does nothing to diminish the fundamental
nature of the minor's constitutional right.").
199. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 623-24.
200. City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 372 (Iowa 1989) (Lavorato, J., dissent-
ing).
201. See id.
202. See id. But cf Schleifer ex rel. Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 848
(4th Cir. 1998) ("Courts have recognized the peculiar vulnerability of children, and the
Supreme Court long ago observed that streets afford dangers for children not affecting
adults. Those dangers have not disappeared; they simply have assumed a different and more
insidious form today. Each unsuspecting child risks becoming another victim of the assaults,
violent crimes, and drug wars that plague America's cities. Given the realities of urban life, it
is not surprising that courts have acknowledged the special vulnerability of children to the
dangers of the streets. Charlottesville, unfortunately, has not escaped these troubling reali-
ties. Two experienced City police officers confirmed to the district court that the children
they observe on the streets after midnight are at special risk of harm.") (internal quotes and
citations omitted).
203. Belloti II, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
204. Recently, on June 16, 2011, Justice Sotomayor delivered an opinion regarding the
rights of a minor to Miranda warnings. Justice Sotomayor stated:
This case presents the question whether the age of a child subjected to police ques-
tioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
[parallel citation omitted]. It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to
submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel
free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that
commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly informs the Miranda custody
analysis.
J.D.B. v. N. Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99 (2011).
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sis that the minor does not fully understand the due process rights
afforded to suspects before trial."'
The precedent described above expands the constitutional pro-
tections available to minors, rather than limiting them. Thus, the
immaturity of minors seemingly entitles them to preferential
treatment under the law and provides to them even greater protec-
tion of their substantive and procedural due process rights than
the protection afforded to adults. This line of reasoning justifies
providing greater protection to the constitutional rights of minors,
while also holding them less culpable.
Additionally, teens who sext are unlikely to consider seriously
the long-term consequences of their conduct.206 Like a coerced
confession or waiver of rights, the press of a button launching a
TSI into cyber space without malicious intent should not result in
criminal charges. After all, the Bellotti II standard is meant to afford
more protection to minors, not less.
In assessing the constitutionality of any law limiting the First
Amendment rights of a teen, courts must finally assess the third
Bellotti I factor by determining whether the state interest in sup-
porting the parental role in child rearing is sufficiently compelling
in association with the other considerations identified by the Bellotti
II Court. This goal is typically furthered when the state observes the
boundary of family privacy and autonomy, thus promoting family
autonomy and legitimizing limited government intrusion when
needed.2 0 ' The state must be vigilant in preserving this boundary
and avoiding the perception of undue state interference under the
guise of supporting parents. Absent restraint, minors may lose faith
in the government's commitment to the freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitution:2 8
For children to have a true sense of all the liberties and
privileges this country has to offer, they must be allowed to
experience them to the greatest extent possible. A government
that promotes this principle is a government that is worthy of
respect in the eyes of children. A government that ignores this
principle does a disservice to all of us.200
205. See, e.g., Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2002).
206. See supra notes 140-146 and accompanying text.
207. City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 372-73 (Iowa 1989) (Lavorato,J., dis-
senting).
208. Id. at 373.
209. Id. (citations omitted).
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The scope of a minor's right to use technology to participate in
teen sexting presents an issue at the core of family privacy and
should be resolved on a family-by-family basis.
In addressing the constitutionality of a curfew case, the New
Mexico Supreme Court reasoned:
The third Bellotti Ilfactor not only demonstrates that there is a
fundamental right at stake, but is also a substantive basis for
holding the curfew unconstitutional. "A long line of cases has
established the Court's view that child-rearing is the role of
parents, not impersonal political institutions." . . . The right to
rear children without undue governmental interference is a
fundamental component of due ... , and "[f] amily autonomy
is as much a right of children as of their parents." Custody,
care, and nurture reside first in parents, though the right is
not absolute and is subject to reasonable regulation and com-
pelling state interests."o
Thus, the third prong of Bellotti l does not favor state legislation of
teen sexting conduct, much less the criminalization of such con-
duct.
Any statute dealing expressly with TSIs is a content-based re-
striction limiting the free speech rights of teens. Therefore, such
legislation must comply with the Bellotti II modified strict scrutiny
standard. Given the foregoing analysis, it is likely that a court
would find that its parens patriae interest in protecting minors from
the harmful consequences of rash decisions would justify limiting,
to some extent, a minor's right to create, possess, and distribute
TSIs. Such legislation is justified because teens are prone to impul-
sive decisions and may not give proportionate weight to the
potential harm that might result from their conduct. To the extent
that the state relies upon protecting minors from harm, this inter-
est should be supported by empirical evidence that establishes a
nexus between the censored speech and the alleged harm."
Moreover, the legislation should shield minors from prosecution
when possible, rather than facilitate it.
Assuming that the state meets its Bellotti II burden and establish-
es a compelling interest to limit a minor's First Amendment rights
in relation to TSIs, the statute at issue must, nevertheless, be nar-
rowly tailored. One circuit court identified the following factors for
210. ACLU v. City of Albuquerque, 992 P.2d 866, 877-78 (N.M. 1999) (citations omit-
ted).
211. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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courts to consider when assessing whether a statute is sufficiently
narrowly tailored: (1) the precise facts that prompted the legisla-
ture to enact the legislation, (2) the logical connection between
the factual premises and the statutory remedy, and (3) the breadth
of the remedy.1 Clearly, child pornography laws sweep too broadly
by treating minors who mimic adult conduct as felons. The prose-
cution of teens for TSIs requires more narrowly tailored laws.
While prosecuting teens engaged in teen sexting as child pornog-
raphers violates all three prongs of the narrowly tailored test, the
Author's proposed statute fares well under this test.
The facts prompting teen sexting legislation are reviewed in de-
tail in a variety of recent law review articles. 2 13 Given the potential
for criminal prosecution under child pornography laws, legislative
reform is needed. The model statute in this Article seeks to marry
the facts prompting legislative action with the proposed remedy by
creating a recognized zone of teen privacy and distinguishing be-
tween reckless and intentional conduct. The model statute limits
jurisdiction to the juvenile court, exempts teens from prosecution
under state and federal child pornography laws, and limits the ad-
judication of teens as delinquent to cases in which there is
evidence of a "specific intent to cause emotional harm, to embar-
rass, or to stigmatize any depicted person or persons." Thus, the
proposed legislation is measured, contains an educational compo-
nent, and permits continuing oversight within the juvenile court
system.
Finally, the model statute is narrowly tailored to educate and de-
ter conduct that is malicious. The Bellotti H Court's focus on the
differences between adults and minors and the state's regulatory
interest should be considered in defining the scope of illegal and
unacceptable teen sexting content. Clearly, any TSIs rising to the
level of the Miller obscenity standard should be prohibited. Addi-
tionally, legislators should treat the violation of teen sexting laws as
a status offense absent evidence of intent to harm others. Finally,
any TSIs created or distributed without the consent of those pic-
tured with the intent to harm or embarrass should likewise be
prohibited. Upon the first offense, the minor should suffer no
threat of confinement and juvenile court jurisdiction should be
exclusive and mandatory.
212. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("In judging
the closeness of the relationship between the means chosen (the curfew), and the govern-
ment's interest, we see three interrelated concepts: the factual premises upon which the
legislature based its decision, the logical connection the remedy has to those premises, and
the scope of the remedy employed.").
213. See, e.g., supra note 73.
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CONCLUSION
Recently, some teens that engaged in sexting have been con-
victed under child pornography laws, sent to prison, and required
to register as sex offenders. These teens have suffered criminal
prosecution for developmentally typical behavior, replicating the
conduct of adults, without evidence that the images in question
caused the type of serious harm that child pornography laws were
designed to deter and punish. The successful application of child
pornography laws to criminalize teen sexting conduct demon-
strates the constitutional overbreadth of the prevailing definition
of child pornography.
Photographs capture and celebrate youth. Teen sexting images
are communication and should be considered forms of protected
teen sexual speech. The permissible limitation of the constitutional
rights of teens explored in Ginsberg, in relation to the First
Amendment, and later revisited in Bellotti II, in relation to privacy
and autonomy, established a modified strict scrutiny standard as
the appropriate standard to apply to laws that impinge upon the
constitutional rights of maturing minors. Thus, any legislation re-
lated to teen sexual speech must be narrowly tailored to protect
the minor from harm or further another compelling state interest.
The statute proposed in Part V above is designed to satisfy the
modified strict scrutiny standard announced by the Bellotti ICourt.
It offers to state legislators a measured and thoughtful response to
teen sexting conduct by: (1) creating a zone of protected teen sex-
ual speech, (2) limiting jurisdiction to the juvenile courts, and
(3) requiring evidence of a teen's intent to harm or embarrass a
third-party as a predicate for a delinquency adjudication. Legisla-
tive reform is vital because the broad definition of child
pornography is being used by prosecutors to brand teens as sexual
predators, to trigger mandatory sex offender registration laws, and
to expose .teens to the condemnation reserved for those, who in
fact, have been convicted of wrongfully sexualizing of children.
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